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PRISON OVERCROWDING IN ALASKA: A
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE CLEARY
SETTLEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1990, the Superior Court for the Third Judicial Dis-
trict of Alaska approved a final settlement agreement in Cleary v.
Smith, I a prisoner class action suit filed nine years earlier challenging
the conditions in Alaska's prisons. The settlement provides for sweep-
ing changes in the operation of Alaska's prison system, and will funda-
mentally alter Alaska's treatment of its prisoners.2 Although officially
a final disposition of the suit, the settlement leaves open the possibility
of further court involvement in Alaska's prison system for some time
to come.
This Note analyzes the Cleary settlement and the legislative re-
sponse it requires. Section II briefly identifies the nature and sources
of Alaska's prison overcrowding problem. Section III describes the
specific provisions of the Cleary settlement and analyzes the impact of
these provisions on Alaska's prison system. Section IV discusses the
need for both short-term and long-term legislative responses to the set-
tlement, and will argue that the legislature should not respond by en-
acting emergency release legislation. The Note concludes with
suggestions for an alternative response by the Alaska legislature.
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1. No. 3AN-81-5274 (Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1990).
2. In January 1983, the superior court approved a partial settlement agreement
which, for the most part, was incorporated into the final settlement. Id. at 1. Thus,
the implementation of many of the changes provided for in the final settlement actu-
ally began several years ago.
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II. THE PRISON OVERCROWDING PROBLEM IN ALASKA
Like most states, Alaska is faced with the overcrowding 3 of its
correctional facilities. While this problem is not new,4 a recent dra-
matic growth in the prison population has seriously strained the prison
system. From 1980 to 1988, Alaska had the largest percentage in-
crease of any state prison population in the country.5 In 1987 and
1988, Alaska ranked fourth among states with regard to the percent-
age of population incarcerated. 6 Furthermore, studies and forecasts
of Alaska's projected prison population indicate that the problem is
likely to worsen before it improves. 7
While it is difficult to attribute these increases to specific causes,
several factors appear significant: (1) Alaska's adoption of presump-
tive sentencing;8 (2) increased law enforcement and prosecution; (3)
3. The term "overcrowding" is used because it is the term most often found in
the literature. The term connotes conditions that, because they are "too crowded,"
are or may be violative of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment. For criticism of this terminology, however, see Bleich, The Politics
of Prison Crowding, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1129-44 (1989) (quoted infra note 111).
4. Overcrowding has been a problem in Alaska's correctional facilities since ter-
ritorial days. ALASKA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR
1988, 33 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS REPORT].
5. ALASKA SENTENCING COMM'N, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE 22 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N
REPORT]. Percentages were measured as the number of persons incarcerated under
sentences of one year or more per 100,000 residents. The actual number of prisoners
(including prisoners in Alaska institutions, residential centers, and those temporarily
housed in the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Minnesota institutions) increased from
771 in December 1979 to 2540 in December 1987. 1988 DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS
REPORT, supra note 4, at 33. This represents a 229.4% increase in the prison
population.
6. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, DRAFT REPORT ON PLEA BARGAINING AND
PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING ch. IV at 6 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT] (citing J. Austin & M. Brown, Ranking the Nation's Most Punitive and
Costly States, FOCUS, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY 2 (July 1989)).
To place Alaska's incarceration rate in context, note that a recent study concluded
that the United States as a whole has the highest incarceration rate in the world.
Pollock & Geyelin, U.S. Incarceration Rate Highest in World, Wall St. J., Jan. 7 1991,
at B5, col. 1.
7. A study by the University of Alaska in 1986 predicted that, without changes
in the status quo, Alaska's probable prison population, both sentenced and un-
sentenced, will total 4080 in 1990 and 8914 by the year 2000. SCHOOL OF JUSTICE,
UNIV. OF ALASKA, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA CORRECTIONAL REQUIREMENTS: A
FORECAST OF PRISON POPULATION THROUGH THE YEAR 2000 ii (1986). The predic-
tions of Alaska's Department of Corrections were more conservative, predicting 3000
inmates by 1990 and close to 4000 by 1995. ALASKA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, FIS-
CAL YEAR 1989 REPORT 27 (1989).
8. To eliminate unjustified disparity and uncertainty in sentencing, the Alaska
legislature enacted a Revised Criminal Code in 1978 which created a presumptive
sentencing system in Alaska. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws
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the Attorney General's ban on plea bargaining;9 and (4) changes in the
public's attitude toward tougher sentences.' 0 Alaska attempted to use
its oil wealth during the 1980s to accommodate prison population in-
creases, but this approach ultimately proved unsuccessful."1 The re-
sult, as in many other states, is that Alaska now has overcrowded
prisons.
Prison overcrowding is not a new phenomenon in Alaska or any
other state. In fact, there has hardly been a time in the history of the
United States that the nation's prisons have not been criticized as be-
ing too crowded.' 2 What is new, however, is the willingness of the
courts to take an aggressive role in hearing prisoners' cases and declar-
ing prison conditions unconstitutional based on overcrowding. 13 Ac-
cording to a report by the National Prison Project, the entire prison
systems of ten states are operating under court orders or consent de-
crees, and thirty other states have at least one institution under order
or decree due to overcrowding.1 4 Cleary demonstrates that Alaska has
not escaped the judiciary's increased Willingness to review the condi-
tions inside state prisons.
(effective Jan. 1 1980). For an excellent discussion of the historical development and
main features of Alaska's presumptive sentencing system, see Stem, Presumptive Sen-
tencing in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 227 (1985).
9. Plea bargaining was officially banned in 1975 by then Attorney General
Avrum Gross. This policy, although altered in practice, remains in place today. For
a bibliography and concise history of the evolution of the plea bargaining ban in
Alaska see DiPietro, The Development of Appellate Sentencing Law in Alaska, 7
ALASKA L. RV. 265, 274 n.69 (1990). For a more complete discussion of the history
of Alaska's plea bargaining, see Cams, A Reevaluation of Alaska's Plea Bargaining
Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REv. - (June 1991).
10. 1990 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at Chapter IV at 6. Other factors con-
tributing to the growth in prison population include increases in the general popula-
tion and state resources, and increases in funding for the police, prosecutors and
courts. Id. See 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 22-28. See also
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1984 (1987) (concluding
in part that increased funding for law enforcement and prosecution, and the plea bar-
gaining ban, rather than presumptive sentencing, were the principle causes of prison
overcrowding); Torgerson, HOUSE RESEARCH AGENCY REPORT, THE IMPACT OF
PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING ON ALASKA'S PRISON POPULATION 13-27 (1986) (ana-
lyzing the effect of changes in the sentencing laws on prison populations).
11. 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 4. Alaska spent $127.4
million for prison construction, renovation and repair during the 1980s. Id. In 1986,
a sharp drop in world oil prices drastically reduced Alaska's revenues and created
economic difficulties for the state and the criminal justice system. 1990 JUDICIAL
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
12. Bleich, supra note 3, at 1144 (noting criticism of crowded prison conditions
since the late eighteenth century).
13. Id. at 1149.




III. THE Cleary Settlement
In 1981, a prisoner class action suit was filed against the state of
Alaska alleging, inter alia, that the crowded conditions of the state's
prison facilities violated the United States Constitution's eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' 5 In
1985, the trial court concluded 16 that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that any pretrial de-
tainee or inmate of the Alaska system had been punished in violation
of the eighth amendment, 17 the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,18 or the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Alaska Constitution.1 9 The court further stated that, with a few noted
exceptions,2o1 Alaska's prisons were not unconstitutionally over-
crowded.21 However, the court concluded that because of the near-
capacity populations at all of the institutions, presumptive population
caps were necessary in order to prevent unconstitutional overcrowding
from occurring in the future.
The court set tentative population caps, subject to revision pursu-
ant to further comment by both parties and further consideration by
the court.22 The state obtained a stay from the Alaska Supreme
Court, pending appeal of these population caps and other remedies,
and both the state and the prisoners fied cross-appeals raising twenty-
five issues. Partly because of the lengthy and complicated record on
appeal, the parties entered into settlement negotiations in 1988 in an
15. Fourth Amended Complaint at 5, 7, Cleary v. Smith, No. 3AN-81-5274
(Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1985).
16. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 27, Cleary v. Smith, No. 3AN-
81-5274 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Cleary Findings and
Conclusions].
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
19. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
20. The court found specific problems in five different institutions. First, numer-
ous inmates at Hiland Mountain Correctional Center were housed on cots in a hall-
way with accass to only one bathroom facility. These conditions were found
unconstitutional. Second, at Meadow Creek Correctional Center, the housing of wo-
men prisoners in bunk-beds in day-rooms was found to constitute unconstitutional
overcrowding. Third, at Cook Inlet Pretrial Facility's Administrative Module, two or
more inmates were commonly housed in single moderate-sized punitive or administra-
tive cells (where prisoners are kept 22 hours a day). The court determined that only
one inmate could constitutionally be housed in such cells. Fourth, the court noted
that further deterioration of conditions at both the Third Avenue and Ridgeview facil-
ities could lead to unconstitutional overcrowding, and thus to the possible closing of
the facilities. Finally, the court noted that, in general, the housing of inmates in non-
residential areas, such as day-rooms, gymnasiums and hallways, constitutes unconsti-
tutional overcrowding. Cleary Findings and Conclusions, supra note 16, at 27-28.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id.
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attempt to resolve the issues on appeal and all other outstanding issues
in the case.23
In September 1990, the court approved a final settlement between
the parties which represented a full and final disposition of the law-
suit.24 The settlement was the culmination of over eighteen months
and 350 hours of face-to-face negotiations between opposing counsel,
and contained provisions addressing nearly every aspect of the prison
system.25 The comprehensive agreement established specific mandates
for Alaska correctional institutions regarding facility requirements;26
operational requirements; 27 rights and opportunities of inmates; 28 clas-
sification, administrative segregation, discipline and grievances; and
overcrowding. The settlement also provides for future monitoring,
modification and enforcement of its terms. While many of the settle-
ment provisions are important from a policy perspective, this note fo-
cuses on perhaps its most significant aspects: prison overcrowding,
population caps and the call for emergency release legislation.
A. Aspects of the Settlement
1. Overcrowding Provisions and Population Caps. As noted, in
1985 the trial court did not find Alaska's prisons, taken as a whole, to
be unconstitutionally overcrowded. The court did, however, set pre-
sumptive caps on the prison population for each facility. 29 The final
settlement agreement and order altered the tentative caps set by the
court in 1985, and adopted a different approach to determining maxi-
mum capacity. The agreement requires the Department of Correc-
tions ("the Department") to promulgate regulations by which the
23. Telephone interview with Michael J. Stark, Assistant Attorney General of the
State of Alaska (Jan. 2, 1991) [hereinafter "Stark Interview"]. Stark has served as
counsel for the state in Cleary since the case was filed in 1981.
24. Final Settlement Agreement and Order, Cleary v. Smith, No. 3AN-81-5274
(Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1990) [hereinafter "Cleary Settlement"]. The Alaska
Rules of Civil Procedure require judicial approval of the settlement of a class action.
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23(e).
25. Stark Interview, supra note 23.
26. The specific mandates include specifications for heat, lighting and ventilation,
non-smoking areas, plumbing, gymnasium and recreation areas, a law library, cell
size, day room space, program support space, visitation rooms, attorney-client rooms,
staff space and new facilities for women. Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 4-8.
27. These specific mandates include provisions for staffing, staff training, fire and
life safety, sanitation, inmate personal hygiene, inmate clothing, bedding, housing,
food services, medical and dental care, and mental health services. Id. at 9-20.
28. These include specifications for exercise and recreation, visitation, telephone
communication, mail communication, inmate information, access to courts and legal
services, access to the law library and legal materials, religious freedom, inmate busi-
nesses, commissary privileges and inmate councils. Id. at 24-43.
29. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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maximum capacity of each facility shall be determined.30 The parties
acknowledged in the settlement agreement that the application of the
enumerated criteria would essentially establish prison population caps
at each institution. 31 However, by providing a formula for determin-
ing maximum capacity, rather than concrete numbers, the settlement
potentially allows for adjustments based on any increases in staff,
space or facilities. 32 Additionally, the settlement prospectively estab-
lishes the dimensions of prison cells in all future facilities in Alaska.33
30. Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 70.
31. Id. at 74. Given present staffing, programming resources, and cell, dormitory
and day-room size, the parties acknowledged that the application of the criteria would
result in the following maximum capacities:
MAXIMUM SPECIAL EMERGENCY
FACILITY CAPACITY BEDS CAPACITY
Cook Inlet Pretrial Facility 397 12 403
Sixth Avenue - Anchorage 104 7 108
Hiland Mountain Correctional Center 225 10 230
Meadow Creek Correctional Center 62 7 66
Palmer Medium Correctional Center 165 10 170
Palmer Minimum Correctional Center 130 0 130
Mat-Su Pretrial Facility 76 6 79
Wildwood Correctional Center 204 12 210
Wildwood Pretrial Facility 112 2 113
Fairbanks Correctional Center 183 21 194
Lemon Creek Correctional Center 164 12 170
Spring Creek Correctional Center 412 32 428
Anvil Mountain Correctional Center 102 4 104
Yukon Kuskokwim Correctional Center 88 8 92
Ketchikan Correctional Center 53 11 59
Id at 74. Totalling these columns reveals that Alaska's prison system has a maximum
inmate capacity of 2477, a maximum special bed capacity of 154, and a maximum
emergency capacity of 2556. The "Emergency Capacity" figures were calculated by
adding one-half of the special beds at a facility to the maximum capacity of that facil-
ity. Id. at 75. The parties also agreed that three institutions could conditionally oper-
ate for one year at slightly higher capacities: Fairbanks Correctional Center (202);
Lemon Creek Correctional Center (175); and Yukon Kuskokwim Correctional Center
(100). Id. at 74-75.
32. Id. at 70-75.
33. The required specifications are a minimum of 60 square feet for one inmate,
80 square feet for two inmates, and 140 square feet for three inmates. Id. at 73. In
cells used for inmates that are locked down more than ten hours per day, these figures
increase to 80, 90 and 150 respectively. Id. at 74. The standard of 60 square feet per
prisoner is consistent with that recommended by the American Correctional Associa-
tion and has been adopted by at least two federal courts in remedying constitutional
violations by state prisons. Bleich, supra note 3, at 1138-39.
[Vol. 8:155
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While the prisoners originally demanded binding34 population
caps, the actual figures employed were mostly suggested by the De-
partment itself.35 Comparing the capacity limits from Cleary with the
capacity limits given by the Department in its 1989 year-end report,
only five facilities will have their capacities reduced by the settlement,
and the total reduction in maximum capacity will be only thirty-nine
inmates.36 The important difference, however, is that the Cleary lim-
its, unlike the Department's limits, are binding on the state. As a re-
sult, failure to comply with the agreement may result in contempt
proceedings and other forms of judicial intervention. 37
2. Emergency Overcrowding Legislation. While prison over-
crowding in Alaska is not as pervasive as it is in many other states,
future increases in prison population may overwhelm Alaska's sys-
tem.38 To avoid such a contingency, the Cleary settlement requires
the Department to seek legislative approval of a prison overcrowding
emergency act that will prevent future overcrowding.39 The legisla-
ture is not obliged to pass such an act, and given the controversial
34. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legal force
of the Cleary Settlement.
35. Stark Interview, supra note 23.
36. These facilities are Fairbanks Correctional Center (reduced by 17); Sixth Ave-
nue Anchorage (reduced by 12); Hiland Mountain Correctional Center (reduced by
4); Lemon Creek Correctional Center (reduced by 10); and Ketchikan Correctional
Center (reduced by 10). See DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FACT SHEET FOR 1989
(1990). The maximum capacity figures of three facilities were actually increased by
the Cleary settlement: Meadow Creek (increased by 6); Mat-Su (increased by 2); and
Wildwood (increased by 6). Id.
37. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for discussion of the Cleary Set-
tlement's legal force.
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39. According to the provisions of the settlement, this legislation shall include:
1. Provision for the declaration of an overcrowding emergency once the
statewide population exceeds maximum capacity for a period of 30 consecu-
tive days.
2. Provision for special discretionary parole consideration of inmates who
have served at least one-half of their sentences and who have been presump-
tively sentenced for a crime other than an unclassified or an A felony; a
Class B felony against a person under [Alaska Statute § 11.41], arson under
[Alaska Statute § 11.46.010], criminal mischief under [Alaska Statute
§ 11.46.480], or attempt or solicitation to commit an A felony under [Alaska
Statute § 11.31.100] or [Alaska Statute § 11.31.110].
3. Provision for early release of eligible inmates into supervised probation
or parole who have served at least half of their sentence and have no more
than 120 days remaining to serve on their sentence, if special discretionary
parole consideration and release does not eliminate the overcrowding
emergency.
4. Provision for a repeat of special discretionary parole and early release
consideration as may be necessary to relieve overcrowding.
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nature of the subject matter, the legislature may choose not to do so.
The settlement provides, however, that if such legislation is not en-
acted by the end of the 1991 legislative session, plaintiffs may file an
action to determine the appropriate capacities for each facility and the
remedies available when such capacities are exceeded. 4°
The agreement also contains provisions that bind the Department
during the interim period until emergency overcrowding legislation is
passed. If legislation is not enacted, the agreement provides for the
continued operation of these interim provisions and for further judicial
involvement.41 These provisions work as follows. The Department
first agrees in principle to prevent prison populations from exceeding
emergency capacity. The Department also agrees to take all reason-
able steps to ensure that facilities operate at or below maximum capac-
ity and do not reach emergency capacity. 42 Further, no individual
facility may exceed its emergency capacity for ten consecutive days, or
for a total of thirty days in any ninety-day period.43 The total inmate
population may not exceed emergency capacity for thirty consecutive
days, or for a total of forty-five days in any ninety-day period.44
The settlement then provides for specific departmental responses
when populations exceed emergency capacity for periods longer than
those stated above. If the population at an individual facility exceeds
emergency capacity for ten consecutive days, the Department must
immediately take action to reduce the inmate population to below
maximum capacity within twenty days.45 If the Department is unable
or unwilling to do this, or if the population in a single facility exceeds
emergency capacity for thirty days in any ninety-day period, the De-
partment must immediately report to the court and present a plan for
reducing population below maximum capacity within twenty days.46
At such a time, plaintiffs are entitled to present objections or requests
for other relief.47
Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 69-70.
40. As a defense to such a claim, the Department reserves the right to assert that
the court lacks the authority to impose such capacities since unconstitutional over-
crowding is a threshold requirement for the court to impose remedies. Cleary Settle-
ment, supra note 24, at 77.
41. Id. at 77.
42. Id
43. Id. "Emergency capacity" is defined as "maximum capacity ... plus inmates
occupying one-half of the number of special beds." Id. Special beds are those allotted
for temporary detention, segregation and medical care. Maximum capacity is defined
according to the criteria set forth in the settlement. See supra notes 31-33 and accom-
panying text.
44. Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 75.
45. Id. at 75-76.
46. Id. at 76.
47. Id
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If the total inmate population exceeds emergency capacity in vio-
lation of the above provisions, the Department "must immediately re-
port to the court and present for approval a plan which provides for
the reduction of the inmate population to below maximum capacity in
each of the Department's facilities within 30 days, and a plan which
will maintain the population level at or below maximum capacity."
'48
These interim provisions will be superseded if and when the
Alaska legislature passes emergency overcrowding legislation consis-
tent with Cleary. If the legislature chooses not to enact such legisla-
tion, the provisions will continue to operate. Regardless of the
legislature's choice, the population caps and the extensive operating
provisions of Cleary are here to stay.
B. Analysis of the Settlement
The Cleary settlement is detailed and comprehensive in its provi-
sions for specific changes to Alaska's prison system.49 The overcrowd-
ing provisions are especially important because they bind the
Department in a way that it was not previously bound, and because
they provide for the possibility of continued court involvement in
Alaska's prison system. The settlement thus represents a significant
victory for those incarcerated in Alaska's prisons. The state, on the
other hand, faces costly compliance with the provisions of Cleary, as
well as some loss of control over the maintenance of the prison system.
From a legal standpoint, these settlement provisions are binding
on the state and are enforceable in a court of law. Settlements are
treated as contracts in Alaska and are governed by state contract
law.5 0 A breach of the settlement agreement by the state would entitle
prisoners to sue for contempt in order to ensure compliance. 51 Thus,
the Cleary settlement operates like a private contract, and the
promises made by the state in the settlement are legally binding on the
state, the Department and the citizens of Alaska.
Given this binding quality, the Department appears to have lost
much of its previous discretion. Prior to Cleary, the Alaska prison
system was subject only to the general eighth amendment prohibition
against overcrowding. The enforcement of this prohibition, however,
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
50. 15A C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement § 22 (1967 & Supp. 1990). A policy
in Alaska favors the termination of litigation and encourages settlements. Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 655 P.2d 748, 751 (Alaska 1982).
51. Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 80. However, an inmate must exhaust the
administrative grievance procedure set out in Section VILE of the settlement prior to
filing an action for contempt. Id. at 65-69. Section VIII.F contemplates a new action




required a lawsuit, which in turn required resources and time. With-
out a specific court order, the Department enjoyed significant flexibil-
ity in resolving temporary increases or fluctuations in the prison
population. A legal challenge to departmental action based on over-
capacity of the prisons would take years and would not immediately
affect current practices. The ability to exceed capacity temporarily in
response to increasing prison populations was a powerful tool for the
Department of Corrections.
The Cleary settlement significantly reduced this flexibility. In ad-
dition to facility and operational requirements, the settlement essen-
tially sets specific population caps at individual institutions. If these
caps are exceaded for specified periods of time, the settlement requires
the Department to reduce the prison population and to report to the
court with a plan for these reductions. If the Alaska legislature enacts
emergency overcrowding legislation, increases in population that ex-
ceed the caps will result in the early release of certain prisoners. 52
Either way, the Department will remain bound by the population caps
set forth in Cleary and will have less flexibility to allow populations
temporarily to exceed capacity.
Another legacy of Cleary is the prospect of continued court in-
volvement in Alaska's prison system. As noted, the settlement func-
tions like a contract. If the state fails to comply with the essential
elements of the settlement, the prisoners may bring an action for
breach of the agreement. Specific settlement provisions also ensure
continued judicial supervision at various points in the compliance pro-
cess.53 While the prisoners' dismissal of the suit was an important
consideration in the state's decision to settle, the Cleary settlement
does not guarantee that the plaintiffs will never be heard from again.
Compliance with Cleary will be complex and ongoing, and the courts
will remain involved in Alaska's prison system for some time to
come.
54
52. If emergency overcrowding legislation is enacted, the settlement bars prison-
ers from bringing an action for overcrowding even if emergency capacities are ex-
ceeded. This guarantee was an important element of consideration received by the
state in the settlement. Id. at 83.
53. See id. at 82-83.
54. See, eg., Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance
with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1815 (1984) (examining the
systemic enforcement of the eighth amendment in prison condition cases); Starr, Ac-
commodation and Accountability A Strategy for Judicial Enforcement of Institutional
Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399 (1981) (proposing general strategy for courts to
facilitate, rather than engineer, institutional changes); Special Project, The Remedial
Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1978) (surveying
the difficulties courts face in devising effective remedies to social problems and discuss-
ing the various interests affected by the remedial activities of the courts); Note, Com-
plex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REv. 626 (1981)
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The Cleary settlement calls for both a short-term and a long-term
response from the Alaska legislature. In the short term, the settlement
requires the Department to seek legislative approval of an emergency
overcrowding act but does not obligate the legislature to pass such an
act.55 The problem of overcrowding in Alaska's prisons is not likely to
disappear, however, even if emergency overcrowding legislation is
passed. Population increases and the continued application of
Alaska's tough sentencing laws will add prisoners to an already bur-
dened system. At some point, the legislature will have to make diffi-
cult, long-term decisions about the overall structure of Alaska's
criminal justice system, or else face the possibility of federal court in-
tervention should the situation deteriorate further.5 6
This section examines the different forms that a legislative re-
sponse to Cleary may take, briefly outlining the long-term options
available and then focusing on the short-term response of emergency
overcrowding legislation.
A. The Long-Term Response to Cleary
Most commentators agree that the ideal response to prison over-
crowding would involve a long-term, comprehensive reworking of the
criminal justice system rather than a short-term adjustment.5 7 Recog-
nizing the importance of formulating a coherent long-term solution to
the overcrowding problem, the Alaska legislature established the
(examining the power available to federal courts to enforce decrees in prison crowding
cases); Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for
Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 367 (1977) (suggesting frame-
work courts can use to prod other branches of government to initiate prison reform
independently).
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. Possible remedies include the following: closing of unconstitutional facilities,
Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1977); ordering the release of inmates
to relieve overcrowding, Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1148 (5th Cir. 1982), modified
on rehearing, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042
(1983); proceeding by way of contempt, Mobile County Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 551 F.
Supp. 92 (S.D. Ala. 1982), afi'd, 703 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1983); and ordering the
construction of new facilities. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.
Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); see Crain v.
Bordenkircher, 342 S.E.2d 422, 448 n.17 (W. Va. 1986) (citing federal court cases
imposing these remedies); Note, Releasing Inmates from State and County Correc-
tional Institutions: The Propriety of Federal Court Release Orders, 64 TEx. L. REv.
1165 (1986) (discussing remedies employed by federal courts in overcrowding cases).
57. See, e.g., N. MORRIS & M. TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION
(1990); Austin, Using Early Release to Relieve Prison Crowding: A Dilemma in Public
Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 404, 443 (1986); THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLIT-
ICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Our Crowded Prisons, 478 ANNALS 1 (1985); Symposium:
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Alaska Sentencing Commission in 1990. The Commission's task is to
evaluate the effect of sentencing laws and practices on the criminal
justice system, and to make recommendations for improving sentenc-
ing practices.58 While a comprehensive analysis of such long-term so-
lutions to Alaska's overcrowding problem is beyond the scope of this
Note, it is useful at this point to at least outline the basic approaches
that may be available in formulating a long-term solution.
There are two basic approaches to solving a crisis in prison popu-
lation: accommodate population increases by building more prisons,
or halt the increases by either reducing the number of prisoners incar-
cerated or by reducing the length of their sentences.5 9 The first ap-
proach is perhaps the most immediately intuitive response to an
overcrowding problem, and has been adopted in many states including
to some extent Alaska.60 Some commentators have rejected this ap-
proach, however, noting that prison populations tend to increase as
fast as, or faster than, space does. 61 These commentators thus deny
that "building yourself out of the problem" is a viable option.62 The
second basic approach alleviates overcrowding by reducing the prison
population, so that existing facilities can accommodate the prisoners
to be incarcerated. The legislative devices used to reduce the prison
population fall into two categories: "front-end" and "rear-end" mech-
anisms. A front-end mechanism seeks to reduce the number of people
entering prison, while a rear-end mechanism seeks to increase the
number of people leaving prison.6 3 Front-end mechanisms include al-
ternatives to incarceration, decriminalization of certain offenses, re-
moval of penal sanctions for certain offenses or presumptions against
Prison Crowding" 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 203; Colloquium: The Prison Overcrowding
Crisis, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.569 (Supp. 1990). For information about the Com-
mission's membership and work'plans, see 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 5.
59. See Torgerson, supra note 10, at vi.
60. During the 1980s, Alaska spent $127.4 million for prison construction, reno-
vation and repair. 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
61. See, e.g., J. MULLEN, K. CARLSON & B. SMITH, I AMERICAN PRISONS AND
JAILS 38, 120 (1980) (arguing that prison capacity drives prison population, rather
than the reverse). For a criticism of this thesis, see Blumstein, Cohen, & Gooding,
The Influence o.f Capacity on Prison Population: A Critical Review of Some Recent
Evidence, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 1 (1983).
62. See, e.g., EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, OVERCROWDED TIME:
WHY PRISONS ARE So CROWDED AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 25 (1982) ("prison
overcrowding is not something we can build our way out of"). California, for exam-
ple, projects that its prisons will be more crowded after spending six billion dollars on
prison construction, than they were before. 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 5, at 3.
63. Weatherburn, Reducing the New South Wales Prison Population: Sentencing
Reform and Early Release, 10 CRIM. L.J. 119, 128 (1986); see also Weatherburn,
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imprisonment.64 By contrast, decreases in the length of sentences, in-
troduction of parole or work release and emergency overcrowding re-
lease provisions all constitute rear-end solutions since they effectively
shorten incarceration periods.65
The basic approaches of increasing capacity or reducing prison
populations vary both in their application and in their efficacy, de-
pending on the system to which they are applied. The legislature has
taken an important first step toward an effective long-term response by
establishing the Alaska Sentencing Commission. This commission,
with the continued support of the legislature, will have the time and
resources to document the underlying causes of Alaska's overcrowd-
ing problem and to analyze the most effective responses available.
With this documentation and research in place, the legislature will
then be prepared to engage in a meaningful public debate on the best
solution to Alaska's problem.
B. The Short-Term Response to Cleary
The Cleary settlement demands a response from the state of
Alaska. While most people would agree that a comprehensive, long-
term solution would be preferable to a stop-gap, short-term solution,
66
this theoretical preference does not eliminate the need for an immedi-
ate response to overcrowding. Such a response may take the form of
non-action, or it may involve substantial changes in the system. Either
way, the legislature will have "responded," and will be sending a clear
message to parties concerned with the problem, including the courts.
The most immediate concern for the legislature is the settlement's call
for emergency overcrowding legislation. If the legislature fails to en-
act such legislation consistent with the terms of the settlement, the
state is likely to find itself back in court.67 The crucial questions,
therefore, are whether Alaska should enact such legislation and, if so,
what form the legislation should take.
1. The Example of Other States. At least thirteen states currently
have emergency overcrowding legislation that provides for the early
release of prisoners when prison populations exceed specified levels.
68
Note: Front-End versus Rear-End Solutions to Prison Overcrowding; A Reply to Profes-
sor Harding, 21 AuSTL. & N.Z J. CRIMINOLOGY 117 (1988).
64. Weatherburn, Note: Front-end Versus Rear-End Solutions to Prison Over-
crowding; A Reply to Professor Harding, supra note 63, at 117.
65. Professor Weatherburn did not favor one of these methods over the other as a
solution to prison overcrowding in New South Wales or any other state. Id. at 119.
66. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 77.
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-28-601 to -606 (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 18-87e, -87f, -87k (1988 & Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-901 to -905 (1981
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All of these states have experienced judicial intervention in their sys-
tems as a result of overcrowding or improper operation of prison facil-
ities. As might be expected, early release legislation is extremely
unpopular, and is a highly controversial approach to alleviating prison
overcrowding.69 Legislators in these states, however, faced with the
possibility of court-ordered closing of institutions and the wide-scale
release of prisoners, reluctantly enacted early release legislation.
While certainly not ideal, such a response allows the legislature to con-
trol which prisoners are released and thus helps protect citizens from
violent early release crime.
Early release programs, which have arisen both with and without
early release legislation,70 vary primarily in terms of their sentencing
structure: whether a state utilizes determinate or indeterminate sen-
tencing.71 In general, states with determinate sentencing schemes em-
ploy existing good-time provisions to move up predetermined inmate
release dates. Indeterminate sentencing states, on the other hand, tend
to use an accelerated parole-board hearing method that brings inmates
before the parole board sooner.72
& Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.598 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 42-2-14, -9-60 (1989 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:764 (West Supp.
1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 47-5-701 to -731 (Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2967.18 (Anderson Sfipp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 570 to 576 (Supp. 1991);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-3-1110 to -2060 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-1-501 to -510 (1990); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 498.025 (Vernon 1990);
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.160 (1988 & Supp. 1990); see also Reed, Prison Over-
crowding: The Connecticut Response, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 389 (1984) (analyzing
Connecticut's Emergency Overcrowding Powers Act); Keeping the Lid on Prisons, 5
Nat'l L.J. 1 (Dec. 13, 1982) (discussing early release statutes); Note, 1989 Georgia
Legislation: Penal Institutions, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 287 (1989) (summarizing the
statute and its legislative history).
Perhaps the most well-known emergency overcrowding law was Michigan's,
which was repealed in 1987 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.71 (1982), repealed by P.A.
1987, No. 101, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1988).
69. Austin, supra note 57, at 405, 409.
70. To alleviate prison overcrowding, some state governors, including Alaska's,
have utilized their pardon authority to release prisoners without the benefit of emer-
gency overcrowding legislation. Illinois' governor implemented a massive early re-
lease program between 1980 and 1983 without the backing of the state legislature,
releasing over 21,000 prisoners. The Illinois Supreme Court significantly restricted
this program in 1983. Austin, supra note 57, at 443. In Alaska, Governor Sheffield
implemented an emergency release system in 1983 entitled the Emergency Conditional
Commutation Release Plan. Between 1983 and 1986, approximately 194 prisoners
were granted early release under this plan. TORGERSON, HOUSE RESEARCH AGENCY
REPORT, THE IMPACT OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING ON ALASKA'S PRISON POPU-
LATION 86-D (1986).
71. Austin, supra note 57, at 405.
72. Id. at 405.
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One fundamental characteristic of all emergency release legisla-
tion is a provision barring the release of prisoners who would pose a
safety hazard to the public. Again, the exact mechanism tends to dif-
fer according to a state's sentencing structure. In indeterminate sen-
tencing states, a board or committee usually reviews the prisoners that
may be released. 73 If the board concludes that a particular prisoner
may pose a hazard to the public, then that prisoner will be denied
early release. Determinate sentencing states usually establish catego-
ries of offenders who will be excluded from the early release mecha-
nisms.74 This approach ensures that prisoners incarcerated for violent
crimes and severe crimes will not be considered for early release.
The success of other states' early release programs is difficult to
gauge because of the many competing policy considerations involved.
For instance, one can debate whether success should be defined by
effective decreases in prison population, by public support for such
programs or by cost-benefit analyses of early release versus other pos-
sible solutions. Furthermore, early release programs are often indica-
tive of the dramatic failures of the criminal justice system. It seems
improper to attribute "success" to a program that is little more than a
last-ditch effort to salvage the remains of a rapidly deteriorating
system.
Despite these many differences, there are several aspects of early
release programs that seem to be consistent from state to state. First,
early release measures are almost always viewed as short-term and
emergency-only options, not as coherent, long-term solutions to over-
crowding. 75 Second, such measures are universally unpopular among
the citizens of states adopting the programs.76 Finally, early release
programs are practical, immediate alternatives to significant court in-
tervention in prison systems, and are effective in reducing prison
populations.77
2. The Argument For Emergency Overcrowding Legislation in
Alaska. As discussed, few supporters of emergency release legislation
view it as a realistic long-term solution to prison overcrowding. 78
73. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-505 (1990).
74. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 573 (1991); see also Cleary Settlement, supra
note 24, at 70 (suggesting categories of offenders to be excluded from Alaska's emer-
gency release program).
75. Austin, supra note 57, at 413.
76. Early release schemes frequently come under public scrutiny when an early
release prisoner commits another crime against a citizen. This exact scenario led to
the recent repeal of Michigan's early release plan, which had been the prototype of
early release programs. See supra note 68; see also Austin, supra note 57, at 447.
77. Austin, supra note 57, at 405.
78. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, as a short-term, stop-gap measure, such legislation may
appeal to the Alaska legislature for several reasons. First, emergency
release legislation provides a practical solution to an immediate prob-
lem and prevents federal courts from intruding into the state prison
system. Second, emergency release legislation is a safety valve to be
used only in emergency situations, and if wide-scale releases result, the
public might respond with an increased commitment of resources. Fi-
nally, emergency release programs are cost-effective, and public safety
can be adequately protected by screening prisoners eligible for release.
This section will discuss these arguments in favor of emergency over-
crowding legislation in Alaska.
Emergency release plans provide a practical, workable solution to
a problem in need of immediate resolution.79 The plans work as they
are supposed to, and effectively control prison populations on an on-
going basis.80 In Alaska's case, such legislation would ensure that the
prison system remains in compliance with the population capacity
figures established by the Cleary settlement. Thus, the Alaska Legisla-
ture may view the enactment of emergency overcrowding legislation as
an effective means of temporarily restraining the prison population un-
til a more permanent, long-term solution can be found.81
Relatedly, the enactment of emergency release legislation will ex-
tricate the courts from the prison system.82 Many states whose prison
systems are under federal court order view such legislation as a means
of preventing the federal courts' intrusion into a distinctly local prob-
lem.83 While the federal courts are not yet involved in Alaska's prison
system, legislators and members of Alaska's executive branch may
view the superior court's intervention in Cleary as intrusive. If the
79. Stark Interview, supra note 23.
80. See Austin, supra note 57, at 407 (concluding that Illinois' three-pronged
strategy of regulating prison admissions, using early release and expanding prison ca-
pacity resulted in Illinois' avoidance of an overcrowding problem and its costly
consequences).
81. One practical option available to Alaska might be to enact a temporary, three
to five year early release scheme. During this time the legislature could work to eradi-
cate the sources of the problem and, having done this, could allow the early release
legislation to expire.
82. Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 77-80. As long as the state complies with
the settlement's provisions, the settlement shall be considered final. Id. at 80. If emer-
gency overcrowding legislation is not enacted, however, the prisoners reserve the right
to file another action against the state. Id. at 77.
83. The Governor of Illinois, James R. Thompson, repeatedly stated that the
worst approach would be to allow prisons to become overcrowded, thereby inviting
the intrusion of federal courts. This belief led him to accept a large-scale early release
program. Austin, supra note 57, at 440. See supra note 70. See also Reed, supra note
68, at 391 n.25 (legislative history of Connecticut's Emergency Overcrowding Act
indicates that the General Assembly acted primarily to avoid federal court
intervention).
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court's involvement becomes protracted, the legislature's resentment
of the court's involvement is likely to rise. The enactment of emer-
gency overcrowding legislation complying with the Cleary settlement
would provide a legislative mechanism for controlling prison popula-
tions, and thus would reduce the possibility of continued court in-
volvement in Alaska's prison system. 84
A third rationale supporting emergency release legislation is that
it can function as a "safety valve," and need not be used to release
prisoners. To avoid the release of prisoners, the state could make
long-term adjustments in its criminal justice system to prevent such a
contingency from ever occurring.85 If, on the other hand, the state did
not change the system to reduce the number of incoming prisoners,
the legislation would make room for these prisoners by releasing
others prior to the expiration of their sentences. Early release legisla-
tion, under this rationale, is an important back-up device that works
only when necessary, and even then only to the extent required to en-
sure compliance with the population caps set in Cleary.
The wide-scale or repeated release of prisoners could also have
the positive long-term effect of educating the public about Alaska's
prison overcrowding problem. Commentators have suggested that
federal court orders releasing prisoners may be an effective long-term
remedy for prison overcrowding if the orders sway public opinion to-
wards increased spending for correctional facilities. 86 If such legisla-
tion worked in Alaska to release significant numbers of prisoners,
sufficient public sentiment might be generated to prompt legislative
action. The enactment of early release legislation in Alaska could be
the drastic measure needed to raise concern and get both public offi-
cials and citizens involved in discussing a long-term solution to the
overcrowding problem. 87
As further support for the enactment of early release legislation,
public safety could better be protected if the legislation is carefully
designed, as it has been in other states, to help minimize crimes by
early release prisoners. The "incapacitation theory" posits that the
incarceration of criminals protects society from at least those crimes
that convicted criminals would have committed had they been on the
84. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
85. Stark Interview, supra note 23 (responding to the author's question of
whether he thought such legislation was an extreme response given the relatively mi-
nor problems in Alaska's system).
86. Note, supra note 56, at 1183 (1986). See also Smolla, Prison Overcrowding
and The Courts: A Roadmap For The 1980s, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 421 (conclud-
ing that courts play a crucial role in informing public opinion about extreme prison
overcrowding).
87. See Comment, supra note 54, at 392 (suggesting that cases involving prison
conditions have sensitized the public to the need for prison reform).
1991]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
streets.88 By carefully limiting the classes of prisoners eligible for early
release,89 Alaska could reduce the risk of violent crimes being commit-
ted by those released during their "risk window" (the time period be-
tween their early release date and their original scheduled release),90
Even if some early release prisoners did commit crimes within
their "risk window," Alaska is likely to be financially better off than if
additional fumds had been spent on new prison construction. One in-
depth state study showed that the costs to society of these additional
crimes were significantly less than the costs the state would have
otherwise incurred building and maintaining new prisons.91 The en-
actment of early release legislation in Alaska would produce signifi-
cant savings to the state, by eliminating considerable prison building
and maintenance costs, and litigation costs. Effective screening provi-
sions would minimize the economic loss to victims of early release
crimes. Aside from the obvious political considerations that would
militate against the use of such an economic argument, the cost-effec-
tiveness of early release presents a viable rationale for the enactment of
emergency release legislation. 92
3. The Arguments Against Emergency Overcrowding Legislation in
Alaska. Despite the aforementioned benefits, the problems associated
with early release programs are more convincing, and confirm that the
Alaska Legislature should not enact such legislation. An early release
program would directly increase the amount of crime suffered by the
public, would compromise general deterrence and would produce a
strong negative reaction by the public. Furthermore, emergency re-
lease would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Alaska Criminal
Code, would promote "dishonesty" in sentencing, and would perpetu-
ate the appearance of overcrowding in Alaska's prisons.
88. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 23 (West 2d ed. 1986).
89. This type of categorical screening is suggested by the settlement, which ex-
cludes the most serious offenders from participation in an early release program.
Cleary Settlement, supra note 24, at 70.
90. Austin, supra note 57, at 467-77.
91. A study of Illinois' early release program between 1980 and 1983 concluded
that the plan was cost-effective. During this period, $49 million in prison operating
costs were averted. This savings was partially offset by the costs associated with
crimes committed by those released early. The costs for processing the 4,500 early
release arrests were estimated to be $3.3 million. More significant were the economic
losses suffered by victims of the early release crimes: these costs totaled at least $13.6
million, a figure that includes the unrecovered value of property and medical services,
but does not include other costs such as lowered wages, changes in lifestyle, and psy-
chological pain and suffering. The study concluded that, as a result of the plan, the
net savings to the state was $1,480 per early release prisoner. Id. at 408-09.
92. Id. at 409.
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Emergency release schemes potentially subject the general public
to crimes that would not have occurred had the offending prisoner
remained in prison. Even a careful screening program cannot fully
eliminate the possibility of early release prisoners committing violent
or otherwise serious crimes.93 The early release study conducted in
Illinois found that, while prisoners selected for early release had a
lower one-year rearrest rate (forty-two percent) than prisoners serving
their full terms (forty-nine percent), the plan substantially accelerated
the incidents of crime suffered by the public.94
The threat to public safety is an integral part of incapacitation
theory.95 Prisoners who remain in jail cannot harm members of the
general public, while those released early may commit crimes that
they otherwise would have been unable to commit. No screening pro-
cess can fully eliminate the significant public risk that is directly at-
tributable to an early release scheme.96 The fact that early release
programs are economically efficient 97 is of little consolation to the vic-
tim of an early release crime.
Furthermore, a well-publicized early release plan might increase
the incidents of minor crime by compromising general deterrence. If
the public were aware that the system was reducing prison sentences,
marginal offenders might be more likely to engage in criminal
activity.98
93. Reed, supra note 68, at 393 n.38 (1984) (noting that, while the Connecticut
legislature intended to release as few dangerous and violent individuals as possible, the
legislature acknowledged that it was inevitable that such prisoners would be released).
94. The study estimated that roughly one percent (4,500 arrests) of the recorded
arrests were attributed to early release from 1980 to 1983, and that the actual amount
of crime committed by early releases during their risk window was nearly two percent
of the total number of reported crimes during that period. Austin, supra note 57, at
408.
95. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
96. This incapacitation argument does not reflect a belief that substantial numbers
of crimes can be avoided by rejecting the early release option. The argument acknowl-
edges that keeping an inmate incarcerated for an additional 90 days (the hypothetical
amount of time cut from his sentence for early release) would at best delay rather than
prevent crimes. Austin, supra note 57, at 455.
Still, the causal link between an early release and a crime suffered by a citizen
during the risk window is virtually impossible for a state to justify. Consider, for
example, the Willie Horton debate from the 1988 Presidential election. It came to the
attention of the American public that Michael Dukakis' weekend prison furlough pro-
gram in Massachusetts had resulted in the release of convicted murderer Willie Hor-
ton who, while on furlough, raped a Maryland woman and stabbed her husband. The
public was outraged, and the story had disastrous effects on Dukakis' campaign. A
NEXIS search of newspapers, journals and magazines from 1988 to February 23, 1991
revealed 1186 articles on the Willie Horton incident. Clearly, the public is extremely
concerned with the release of potentially violent prisoners.
97. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
98. Austin, supra note 57, at 405.
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In addition to these practical considerations, theoretical problems
also militate against an early release program in Alaska. For example,
selective incapacitation - the careful extension or reduction of prison
terms according to criteria that establish high-risk and low-risk pris-
oners99 - is one of the most effective forms of screening in terms of
public safety, yet it is also the most objectionable in terms of uniform-
ity, certainty and integrity of sentencing. Incapacitating the highest-
risk offenders beyond current sentences would likely produce a decline
in crime rates, but would also have the unsettling effect of punishing
persons for crimes they did not commit. I°° By contrast, a method of
selective discretionary screening of prisoners for early release, in the
form of case-by-case reviews by prisoner parole boards, would avoid
this pitfall, but would also inject an element of arbitrariness and dis-
parity into the sentencing process.
Similarly, even if the Alaska Legislature were to follow the Cleary
settlement and establish specific categories of offenses eligible for re-
lease, such an approach would conflict with the Revised Criminal
Code's objectives of certainty and uniformity in sentencing. 01 Those
prisoners who were convicted of crimes that made them ineligible for
early release would be treated uniformly. All other prisoners, how-
ever, would be subject to uncertain, nonuniform treatment. Sentence
lengths for prisoners convicted of the same crime would vary based
purely on timing and the chance declaration of an overcrowding
emergency.
The enactment of an early release plan in Alaska would also have
a negative effect on the public's perception of the criminal justice sys-
tem. As noted, a well-publicized early release program could compro-
mise effective general deterrence. 02 An early release plan could also
99. Greenwood and Abrahamse argue that selective incapacitation can achieve
reductions in both crime rates and prison population growth. Von Hirsch & Gottfred-
son, Selective Incapacitation: Some Queries About Research Design and Equity, 12
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11, 42-45 (1984) (citing P. GREENWOOD & A.
ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982)).
100. Id.
101. Alaska enacted a presumptive sentencing system in 1978 with the express pur-
pose of "eliminat[ing] unjustified disparity in sentences imposed on defendants con-
victed of similar offenses - disparity which is not related to legally relevant
sentencing criteria." Stem, supra note 8, at 228 (quoting ALASKA SENATE COMM'N
ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMENTARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE,
ALASKA SENATE J. Supp. No. 47, at 148 (June 12, 1978)). Hanrahan and Greer
suggest that "'the idea that offenders convicted of similar crimes should receive
roughly the same punishment' is universally appealing since 'even philosophically or
politically diverse groups can agree that deviations from some sentencing norm are
undesirable.'" DiPietro, supra note 9, at 269 n.29 (quoting Hanrahan & Greer, Crim-
inal Code Revision and the Issue of Disparity, in SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERI-
MENTS IN REDUCING DISPARITY 35, 36 (M. Forst ed. 1982)).
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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cause the public to become further disenchanted with what it already
perceives as an ineffective and overly lenient criminal justice system.10 3
The enactment of early release legislation in Alaska would serve notice
to the citizens of Alaska that the state had lost effective control of the
system.
This "loss of control" would be important to the state of Alaska
both practically and theoretically. Early release would seriously com-
promise the "integrity" of the criminal justice system by eliminating
the state's control over the incarceration of its prisoners. Once capac-
ity was reached, the system would be controlled by an automatic re-
lease mechanism which the state would be unable to counteract.
While the release of prisoners would probably not be extensive imme-
diately, large increases in prison population could eventually result in
wide-scale releases, which the state would be powerless to prevent. 1 4
Theoretically, it is troublesome to modify an aspect of the crimi-
nal justice system based on a negative reason such as overcrowding.10 5
Ideally, the system should be designed, and changes implemented,
based on positive reasons such as goals, values and expectations. If
Alaska's goal is to create a rational, uniform and comprehensive sen-
tencing structure,10 6 then the enactment of early release legislation
would seriously compromise this goal and the integrity of Alaska's
criminal justice system.
The enactment of early release legislation, moreover, would pro-
mote political manipulation of the overcrowding problem. Early re-
lease legislation could allow legislators to avoid the real issues and
difficult choices involved with long-term solutions to prison over-
crowding. While early release legislation would almost certainly be
unpopular, it is conceivable that legislators might seek to pass the
blame to the court that approved the Cleary settlement, thereby defer-
ring responsibility for the overcrowding problem. The legislature
could protest publicly that the courts were "letting out" the very pris-
oners that the state had worked so hard to put in jail, all the while
denying the causal nexus between tougher sentencing laws and strains
on prison populations.
With such a release valve in place, other political players could
advance their own agendas and their own manipulations of the system.
District attorneys could prosecute heavily during election years to
103. Austin, supra note 57, at 405.
104. See supra note 7, discussing forecasts of Alaska's prison population. But see
Note, supra note 56, at 1183-85 (suggesting that wide-scale releases would have the
positive effects of sensitizing the public to the need for prison reform and prompting
government officials to authorize additional funding for corrections).
105. N. MORRIS & M. TONRY, supra note 57, at 37.
106. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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"put criminals behind bars," and legislators could campaign on typical
"get tough on crime" platforms, confident that the early release mech-
anism would relieve the problems they were creating. 10 7 The enact-
ment of early release legislation in Alaska would thus foster
"dishonesty" within the criminal justice system. Legislators, prosecu-
tors and the Governor could promote their "get tough on crime"
stance and stress the need for "stiffer" sentences while simultaneously
providing an escape valve for the release of prisoners they knew could
not fit into the system.108
Legislators should not enact tough sentencing laws unless they
are willing to fund the expansion of prison space that such laws will
require. 0 9 The enactment of an early release scheme, however, could
shield legislators from having to make hard decisions about sentencing
and enforcement policies. What Alaska needs is a well-informed pub-
lic debate about the goals and functioning of the entire criminal justice
system. Early release legislation would be an embarrassing example of
the legislature passing the buck by refusing to deal squarely with
problems demanding a long-term response.
Professor Bleich describes another potential "political" effect of
early release legislation in Alaska." 0 Bleich asserts that "crowding"
of prisons is not objectively identifiable, but is rather a label used by all
participants involved in the overcrowding"' debate to pursue their
107. It is common knowledge that each branch of government contributes to the
overcrowding problem: legislatures by passing tougher and longer sentences, prosecu-
tors by operating with increased resources and public support, judges by responding to
the public's cry for tough sentences and parole boards by hesitating to release
prisoners.
108. See Keeping the Lid on Prisons, supra note 68, at 10, col. 4 (predicting that
legislators will increasingly use "relief valves" like early release without addressing the
underlying causes of overcrowding).
109. A principle cause of prison overcrowding is faulty legislative planning, which
results in major changes in sentencing without accompanying allocations of additional
prison resources. Austin, supra note 57, at 431. Some commentators have suggested
requiring that prison impact statements accompany each new piece of mandatory min-
imum sentencing legislation, thus forcing legislators to debate openly the costs associ-
ated with tough sentencing laws. See, e.g., Blumstein, Panel: The Question of
Appropriate Sentences: Responding to Prison Overcrowding Through Sentencing Policy,
12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 85, 134 (1984). The Alaska Sentencing Commis-
sion has recognized the need to gather information to aid legislators in making re-
source allocation decisions. 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
110. Bleich, supra note 3.
111. A critic of this terminology, Professor Bleich, states in his article that
[t]he term 'overcrowding' is redundant at best, since crowding already refers
to a higher level of social density than is desired. At worst, the term begs
one of the central questions posed by this Comment - namely, at what
point does a prison's population become so great that the risks to prisoners'
health and safety outweigh society's demand that the prisoners be punished,
or that the prisons simply become administratively unmanageable.
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own agendas.1 12 Prisoners are interested in reducing their stay in
prison, prison officials in obtaining increased funding, and legislators
in garnering public support for additional prison construction.1
13
While prison policy decisionmakers have an interest in relieving over-
crowded conditions, they also have an interest in perpetuating the ap-
pearance of an overcrowding crisis. For example, California prison
officials have in the past manipulated administrative mechanisms, such
as prisoner transfers, in order to keep their prison populations above
rated capacity and thereby assure future appropriations and the reten-
tion of key personnel. 114
If Bleich's theory is correct, it is doubtful that emergency over-
crowding legislation would solve Alaska's overcrowding problem even
in the short run, since the problem is not solely attributable to in-
creased prison populations. Such legislation would decrease the num-
bers of prisoners in Alaska's system, but would not lessen the
perception of overcrowding which is vital to the political interests of
all parties involved in the debate.
A final argument against emergency overcrowding legislation is
that it would be an extreme response to a relatively minor problem.
While problem areas certainly exist in Alaska's prisons, Alaska's sys-
tem compares favorably to other states' systems. Expert testimony in
Cleary concluded that, in terms of safety and humane treatment of
prisoners, Alaska's prisons rank in the top ten of state correctional
facilities.115 Serious violent behavior has been absent from Alaska's
prisons. At the time of trial in 1984, there was no evidence of a single
murder, assault with a weapon or successful suicide. 1 6 As one expert
noted, "stabbings, beatings and violent attacks that occur regularly in
large state systems, and even small state systems, just aren't present in
the State of Alaska correctional system."' 1
7
This testimony suggests that some of the principle reasons for en-
acting emergency overcrowding legislation - to ensure the safety of
Id. at 1125 n.2.
112. Id. at 1154.
113. Id. at 1154-74; see also Jacobs, The Politics of Prison Expansion, 12 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 209 (1984) (discussing the political and legal processes of
prison expansion).
114. Bleich, supra note 3, at 1176-77; see also Holbert & Call, The Perspective of
State Correctional Officials on Prison Overcrowding: Causes, Court Orders, and Solu-
tions, 53 FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1989, at 25, 28 (1989) (study analyzing the perspec-
tive of state correctional officials found, inter alia, that their favored solution to prison
overcrowding is increased hiring of correctional and security staff).
115. Cleary Findings and Conclusions, supra note 16, at 1-6 (testimony of Anthony
Travisono, Executive Director of the American Correctional Association).
116. Id. at 3.




prisoners and guards, and avoid prison violence' 18 - are simply not a
factor in Alaska. Conditions in Alaska's prisons are among the best in
the nation. It would be senseless to compromise the integrity of a rela-
tively successful system by resorting to the last-gasp tactics of states
burdened with much greater problems. Emergency overcrowding leg-
islation may be appropriate in states whose prison systems are on the
verge of collapsing, but is inappropriate for Alaska. For all the afore-
mentioned reasons, the Alaska Legislature should reject emergency
overcrowding legislation as a response to Cleary.
V. CONCLUSION: ALASKA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
While good news for Alaska's prisoners, the Cleary settlement is
less satisfactory to the government and citizens of Alaska. The settle-
ment imposes capacity limits on Alaska's institutions and, more im-
portantly, provides for continuing judicial involvement in the prison
system should these limits be exceeded. To enforce the prescribed lim-
its, the settlement calls for the enactment of emergency overcrowding
legislation that will require the early release of prisoners once the pris-
ons become too crowded. It appears that, with the Cleary settlement,
Alaska has relinquished control over crucial aspects of the criminal
justice system. It is time to regain this control. The legislature should
not take the easy way out of this crisis, and should not enact emer-
gency overcrowding legislation. 119
For both theoretical and practical reasons, the time is ripe for the
legislature and the citizens of Alaska to reestablish control over the
criminal justice system. Because of the significant risks of political
manipulation, early release legislation should be scrapped, and the leg-
islature should instead begin working on both short-term and long-
term responses to Cleary. Each party to the debate has a stake in per-
petuating the appearance of an overcrowding crisis.120 Instead of
avoiding the problem, the legislature should confront it directly.
The first goal for the legislature is to limit judicial interference
with the prison system by conforming with the mandates of the Cleary
settlement. The legislature should "ratify" the Cleary population caps
in the form of legislation. This would send a message to the court that
118. Austin, supra note 57, at 410.
119. Just before this Note went to press, SB 215 and HB 224 (both entitled "An
Act Relating to Population Management in the State Correctional System") were in-
troduced into the Alaska Senate and House of Representatives. These identical bills,
as introduced, follow the guidelines of the Cleary settlement. The bills are unlikely to
pass unamended and therefore, a substantive discussion of their provisions has not
been included.
120. Bleich, supra note 3, at 1154.
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the state will abide by the settlement's figures. The next step, poten-
tially more difficult from a political standpoint but necessary to satisfy
the courts, is to reduce the populations of prisons that are over capac-
ity by placing select prisoners into intensive supervision. 121 This plan
of action is not equivalent to enacting early release legislation. The
legislature will have regained control of the system by actively decid-
ing to reduce the prison population rather than passively waiting by
while the early release mechanism automatically engages.
With the short-term compliance response to Cleary in place, the
legislature will be ready to begin crafting a long-term response that
will guarantee that the overcrowding problem does not recur. Build-
ing on the Sentencing Commission's work, the legislature should try to
foster public debate on the goals of the criminal justice system and the
possible means of maintaining an acceptable prison population. Legis-
lators may decide to limit the number of persons imprisoned by in-
creasing the alternatives to incarceration. These alternatives might
comprise a variety of less costly intermediate sanctions, such as inten-
sive supervision. Alternatively, legislators may decide to change the
sentencing laws to reduce the incarceration period for certain catego-
ries of offenders. A third option is for the legislators to "build them-
selves out of the crisis," by authorizing the construction of new
facilities to keep pace with population increases. The exact form the
legislative response should take is beyond the scope of this note. What
is important to this author is that the legislature take responsibility for
its actions and actively debate and plan for the future.
Bradford J Tribble
121. Intensive supervision programs provide a relatively inexpensive, effective al-
ternative to incarceration, and are suitable for offenders who are considered too seri-
ous a risk for routine probation. The programs subject the offender to strict and
frequent reporting requirements to a probation officer with a substantially reduced
caseload. Furthermore, participants in these programs often pay victim restitution,
perform community service, hold a job, submit to random drug and alcohol testing,
and pay a probation supervision fee. 1990 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note
5, at 35. See also N. MORRIS & M. TONRY, supra note 57, at 180-86 (discussing
intensive supervision and other "intermediate sanctions").
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